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NOTES
FEDERAL COURTS-IN RE UNITED STATES-SHOULD
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES BE DELEGATED THE AUTHORITY TO
ApPROVE ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE ApPLICATIONS?
INTRODUCTION
In Katz v. United States, 1 the United States Supreme Court
held that the protection of the Fourth Amendment applied to the
subjects of electronic surveillance and, as such, law enforcement of
ficials could not use a wiretap without first obtaining a warrant. 2
Shortly after Katz was decided, the 90th Congress enacted Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act3 (the "Crime
Bill") as a means of controlling the use of electronic surveillance.
Title III was enacted to protect individual privacy rights while al
lowing law enforcement officials access to a highly effective surveil
lance technique. A few months later, the same Congress enacted
the Federal Magistrates Act4 (the "Magistrates Act") to improve
the efficiency of the federal judicial system by creating a tier of
qualified officials to assist district court judges.
In 1993, Judge Korman, presiding in the Eastern District of
New York, delegated the task of approving a wiretap application to
a United States Magistrate Judge,S raising the issue of whether the
Magistrates Act authorized the delegation of Title III authority. In
In re United States,6 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that because the language of Title III did not
specifically authorize delegation of wiretap authority to magistrates,
the privacy concerns underlying the enactment of Title III pre
1. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2. Id. at 357.
3. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510
2521 (1988 & Supp. V 1993».
4. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.c. §§ 631-639
(1988 & Supp. V 1993».
5. In re United States Attorney, 784 F. Supp. 1019 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd, 10 F.3d
931 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 64 (1994).
6. 10 F.3d 931 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 64 (1994).
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vented a magistrate's powers from being broadly construed in the
area of electronic surveillance applications?
The legislative history of the Magistrates Act clearly demon
strates that Congress intended judges to make innovative use of
magistrates in order to improve the efficiency of the judicial sys
tem. 8 It is equally clear from the legislative history of Title III that
Congress designed that legislation to ensure the use of electronic
surveillance would be subject to restrictions that would protect indi
vidual privacy rights. 9 This Note will examine whether the concern
for individual privacy that motivated the passage of Title III pre
cludes the delegation of wiretap approval to a magistrate. Part I of
this Note will review the legislative history and judicial decisions
underlying Title III as well as the legislative history and judicial in
terpretation of the Federal Magistrates Act. A primary focus of
Part I will be the criteria developed by the Supreme Court to deter
mine functions which can be delegated to a magistrate. Part II of
this Note will examine the reasoning of the Second Circuit in In re
United States. Part III will reexamine the issue presented to the
Second Circuit in light of congressional intent in passing Title III
and the Magistrates Act and in light of prior judicial interpretation
of the Federal Magistrates Act. Finally, this Note will conclude that
the Second Circuit's narrow construction of the Magistrates Act
was inconsistent with congressional intent and prior judicial inter
pretation of the Act.
I.

A.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Legislative History of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 10
1.

Congressional Purpose in Enacting Title III

Congress passed Title III of the Crime Bill for the dual pur
poses of protecting the privacy of communications and creating a
uniform standard for permitting law enforcement agencies to moni
tor communications in criminal investigations. l l At the time Title
III was passed, Congress found little uniformity among the states
7. Id. at 938.
8. See infra part I.B for a discussion of the legislative history of the Federal Mag
istra tes Act.
9. See infra part I.A for a discussion of the legislative history of Title III.
10. 18 U.S.c. §§ 2510-2521 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
11. S. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153.
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regarding the approval and use of wiretaps,12 National legislation
was needed to correct a body of state and federal law which was
"totally unsatisfactory" in terms of providing for privacy rights and
justice. 13
Although Title III was designed primarily to govern the use of
electronic surveillance by state and federal law enforcement agen
cies, Congress' concern for privacy rights necessitated that all uses
of electronic sut:Veillance be controlled. As a result, Title III im
posed a blanket prohibition on all electronic surveillance. 14 Con
gress then created an exception to this prohibition to allow law
enforcement officials to employ electronic surveillance techniques
when authorized by a "court of competent jurisdiction."15 The
principal target of electronic surveillance was organized crime and
Congress noted that communications were essential in conducting
large scale criminal activity.16 Even though wiretaps were viewed
as a necessary adjunct to the prosecution of organized crime, guide
lines were required to prevent violations of the Fourth
Amendment.17
12. S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 69, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2156.
13. Id.
14. 18 U.S.c. § 2511(1) provides that it is unlawful for any person to intercept any
wire, oral, or electronic communication; use any device intended to intercept such com
munications; disclose the contents of such communication; or use the contents of such
communications. ld.
15. § 2516. Section 251O(9)(a) defines a court of competent jurisdiction as: "(a) a
judge of the United States district court or a United States court of appeals; and (b) a
judge of any court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State who is authorized by a
statute of that State to enter orders authorizing interceptions or wire, oral, or electronic
.
communications." Id.
16. Congress also noted the difficulty in locating witnesses willing to testify
against criminal organizations due to fear or self-interest. S. REp. No. 1097, supra note
11, at 70-74, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2157-61.
17. The Senate Judiciary Committee was concerned that individual privacy was at
great risk due to technological advances, noting:
The tremendous scientific and technological developments that have taken
place in the last century have made possible today the widespread use and
abuse of electronic surveillance teChniques. As a result of these develop
ments, privacy of communication is seriously jeopardized by these techniques
of surveillance .... No longer is it possible, in short, for each man to retreat
into his home and be left alone. Every spoken word relating to each man's
personal, marital, religious, political, or commercial concerns can be inter
cepted by an unseen auditor and turned against the speaker to the auditor'S
advantage.
Id. at 2154. See also Lori K. Odierna, Note, In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveil
lance Evidence: Third Party Access to Government-Acquired Wiretap Evidence, 17 W.
NEW ENG. L. REv. 371, 373-77 (1995).
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2. Judicial Decisions Underlying Title III
The history of Supreme Court decisions defining the permissi
ble use of wiretaps begins with Olmstead v. United States .18 In Olm
stead, the Court held that the use of a wiretap did not violate the
Fourth Amendment so long as no other laws were broken by the
law enforcement agents who installed and used the device.1 9 Con
gress responded to Olmstead by passing the Federal Communica
tions Act,2° prohibiting unauthorized use of electronic surveillance.
The broad authorization to use wiretaps, which the Court granted
in Olmstead, was gradually narrowed through a series of cases,2l
culminating in Berger v. New York 22 and Katz v. United States. 23
18. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). For a discussion of the evolution of Supreme Court wire
tap decisions beginning with Olmstead, see Michael Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and
Title III: Rewriting the Law of Electronic Surveillance, 74 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOL
OGY 1 (1990).
19. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. In Olmstead, federal officers tapped the phones of
conspirators engaged in importing and distributing bootleg liquor during Prohibition.
The agents monitored communications between the conspirators for several months via
taps placed on phone lines outside their office and residences. In holding that the con
spirators' Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, the Court reasoned that the
prohibition concerning unreasonable search and seizure applied only to material things.
The Court refused to read the Fourth Amendment broadly to allow for changes in tech
nology. '''The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in light of what was deemed an
unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted and in a manner which will con
serve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.'" Id. at
465 (quoting Carroll v. United States,267 U.S. 132, 149 (1924». So long as the federal
agents did not trespass on the property of those being tapped, the Court found there
was no violation of Fourth Amendment rights because the telephone user "intends to
project his voice to those quite outside, and that the wires beyond his house and the
messages while passing over them are not within the protection of the Fourth Amend
ment." Id. at 466.
Although the Court was unwilling to find the Fourth Amendment prohibited wire
taps, it noted that Congress was free to restrict the use of wiretaps by direct legislation.
Id. at 465-66.
20. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1988) provides that "[n]o person not being authorized by the
sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence [or] con
tents ... of such intercepted communication to any [other] person." Id.
21. See, eg., Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (evidence obtained by
wiretaps in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605 is inadmissible in federal court); Weiss v. United
States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939) (wiretaps are prohibited for the interception of intrastate as
well as interstate calls).
Subsequently, the Court held that the Olmstead standard applied to "bugging" as
well as wiretapping. The installation of listening devices was held to be permissible, so
long as no illegal physical trespass occurred when the listening device was installed.
Compare Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942) (evidence obtained by a
microphone placed against a common wall was admissible since there was no physical
trespass) with Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (evidence obtained by a
microphone placed inside a heating duct was inadmissible).
22. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Berger involved the New York State eavesdropping stat
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The provisions of Title III were designed to conform to the
criteria developed by the United States Supreme Court in Berger.24
There, the Court held that a warrant for the use of a wiretap must:
(1) describe, with particularity, the person, place and/or things to be
searched; (2) describe the specific crime committed or being com
mitted; (3) describe the type of conversation sought; (4) limit the
scope of intrusion to prevent the search of unauthorized areas and
to end the search once the necessary evidence was obtained; and (5)
provide that the executing officer make a return on the warrant
showing how it was executed and the results seized.25 The Berger
criteria are reflected in the authorization26 and procedure27 sections
of Title III, which delineate in detail the procedure for obtaining
authorization and using electronic surveillance devices. While Ber
ger established the criteria that a warrant must satisfy, it was in
ute. Berger was convicted for conspiring to bribe the chairman of the New York State
Liquor Authority based on evidence obtained through a series of eavesdropping orders.
The Court found the New York statute to be overly broad, resulting in a violation of
Berger's Fourth Amendment rights. This violation was due to a failure adequately to
meet Fourth Amendment criteria for the issuance of a warrant. Id. at 55-57.
23. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See Samuel Dash, Katz Variations on a Theme by Ber
ger, 17 CATH. U. L. REv. 296 (1968); Robert F. Scoular, Wiretapping and Eavesdrop
ping: Constitutional Developments From Olmstead to Katz, 12 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 513
(1968).
24. Congress noted that Title III was specifically drafted to meet the criteria out
lined in Berger and to be in conformity with Katz. S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at
66, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2153.
25. Berger, 388 U.S. at 55-57.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) provides:
The Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney Gen
eral, or any Assistant Attorney General, any acting Assistant Attorney Gen
eral, or any Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division
specially designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to
a Federal judge of competent jurisdiction for, and such judge may grant in
conformity with section 2518 of this chapter an order authorizing or approving
the interception of wire or oral communications ....
Id.
Title III also lists the specific offenses which can be the target of electronic surveil
lance such as: crimes relating to the sabotage of nuclear facilities; offenses involving
kidnapping, murder or extortion; bribery of public officials; Presidential assassination;
and unlawful use of explosives. § 2516(1)(a)(b)(c).
27. Section 2518 provides: "(1) Each application for an order authorizing or ap
proving the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication under this chapter
shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction
and shall state the applicant.'s authority to make such applications." Id.
Congress noted this provision was intended to conform to the criteria enumerated
in Berger and to assure that a judicial authority be interposed between law enforcement
officials and citizens per Katz. S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 97, reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2185.

276

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:271

Katz that the Court abandoned the Olmstead doctrine that physical
intrusion was required to implicate the Fourth Amendment prohibi
tion against unreasonable search and seizure. 28
Federal agents in Katz monitored a suspect's telephone con
versation by placing a recording device on the outside of a public
telephone booth. 29 The government argued that, consistent with
the Olmstead doctrine, no warrant was required because there was
no physical intrusion into the booth.3D In Katz, the Court aban
doned the Olmstead doctrine and held that any electronic eaves
dropping constituted a search and seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. 31 Once electronic surveillance was catego
rized as a search and seizure, it became necessary for law enforce
ment officers to obtain a judicially authorized warrant before
initiating the surveillance. 32
The need for prior judicial authorization is addressed directly
by Title Ill's requirement that applications for electronic surveil
lance be submitted to "a judge of competent jurisdiction" who may
approve or modify the application.33 Although electronic surveil
lance fell within the scope of the Fourth Amendment, Congress was
unwilling to grant comparable wiretap activity to all of the judicial
officers authorized to issue search warrants. Congress specified
28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
29. Id. at 349.
30. Id. at 352.
31. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, reasoned that "the Fourth Amend
ment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches and
seizures." Id. at 353. Stewart noted that the Olmstead doctrine rested on narrow tres
pass grounds that the Court would no longer apply:
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so
eroded by our subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine there enunci
ated can no longer be regarded as controlling. The Government's activities in
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the pri
vacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus
constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
Id.
32. In Katz, the Court noted that the agents acted with restraint. The surveil
lance was limited in scope and time and was confined to those periods necessary to
obtain information. Id. at 354.
The surveillance would have been proper had the agents taken the step of seeking
a warrant from a "duly authorized magistrate" prior to initiating the surveillance.
"[T]he Constitution requires 'that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer·
... be int.erposed between the citizen and the police ....'" Id. at 357 (quoting Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1962».
33. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1988) (providing the procedure for interception of wire, oral
or electronic communications).
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that applications could only be approved by a "judge of competent
jurisdiction"34 and defined that term, as applied to the federal judi
cial system, as a "judge of a United States district court or a United
States court of appeals."35 Thus, Congress effectively and inten
tionally barred United States commissioners, who could issue both
search and arrest warrants, from authorizing electronic surveillance
applications. 36
In addition to limiting which judicial officers could approve an
electronic surveillance application, Congress also limited which law
enforcement officials could apply for a wiretap warrant. 37 This limi
tation was intended to create a clear line of responsibility within the
Department of Justice as a means of centralizing authority and min
imizing potential abuses. 38
In sum, Congress enacted TItle III to protect the privacy of the
public in general·by establishing an outright ban39 on electronic sur
veillance. Congress then enacted a detailed list of requirements to
be complied with before the use of electronic surveillance by law
enforcement officials could be approved. 40 These requirements
were designed to assure that authorization of the use of electronic
surveillance would satisfy the constitutional criteria enumerated by
the Supreme Court in Katz and Berger.41

34. Id.
35. § 251O(9)(a). Additionally, a wiretap may be authorized by "a judge of any
court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State." § 2510(9)(b).
36. S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 91, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2179.
Commenting on the definition in § 2510(9), the Senate Judiciary Committee noted:
Paragraph (9) defines "judges of competent jurisdiction." This definition
designates the judicial officers whose responsibility it will be to supervise au
thorized interceptions. Existing Federal search warrant practice permits U.S.
Commissioners and city mayors to issue warrants (18 U.s.C. § 3021 (1964».
This practice is too permissive for the interception of wire or oral communica
tions. Only judges of Federal district courts or courts of appeal should issue
Federal warrants. . . . This is intended to guarantee responsible judicial partici
pation in the decision to use these techniques.
Id. (emphasis added).
37. § 2516(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See supra note 26 for the text of § 2516(1).
38. S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 97, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2185.
39. § 2511 (prohibiting the interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic
communications).
40. §§ 2516-2519 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
41. S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 66, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2153.
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Legislative History of the Federal Magistrates Act

1. The Original Federal Magistrates Act

O;mgress passed the Federal Magistrates Act42 in 1968 "to
abolish the office of U.S. commissioner and reform the first echelon
of the federal judiciary into an effective component of a modern
scheme of justice by establishing a system of U.S. magistrates."43
The commissioner system contained a number of defects that
prevented commissioners from becoming an effective component of
the federal court system. Compensation was based on a fee system
which limited earnings to $10,500 per year. 44 This low salary level
made it difficult to attract highly qualified individuals to serve as
commissioners.45 Additionally, Congress believed that the pecuni
ary interest created by the fee-for-service system was inconsistent
with the neutral administration of justice.46
Congress addressed the deficiencies of the commissioner sys
tem through the creation of magistrates. In this way, Congress
hoped to attract a higher quality judicial officer and expand upon
the duties previously delegated to commissioners.47 Congress
vested the magistrate with all powers previously held by United
States commissioners,48 as well as the powers to hear and determine
pretrial matters and conduct preliminary hearings on post trial
motions. 49
42. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
43. H.R. REP. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4252, 4253-54.
44. H.R. REp. No. 1629, supra note,43 at 13, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
4255-56.
45. [d. Commissioners worked on a fee-for-service basis. Therefore, their total
income was determined by the number of services performed. Because total income
was limited by the $10,500 ceiling, there was little incentive for efficiency or productiv
ity. Additionally, a commissioner was not required to be a member of the bar, and in
1968, nearly one third of the commissioners were not lawyers. This, in tum, meant that
commissioners often lacked the requisite education to deal with the rules of law they
sought to apply. Id.
46. Id.
47. H.R. REp. No. 1629, supra note 43 at 14, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
4257.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(I) (1988).
49. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.c. § 636
(1988». These powers arose from the "additional duties" clause. A magistrate could
be assigned:
[S]uch additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws
of the United States. The additional duties authorized by the rule may in
clude, but are not restricted to
(1) service as a special master in an appropriate civil action ... ;
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Other sections of the Federal Magistrates Act were designed to
eliminate specific deficiencies in the commissioner system. Under
the Act, magistrates are required to be a member of the bar and
their competence must be acceptable to the district judge making
their appointment. 5o Compensation of magistrates was set to ap
proximate that of district court judges,51 and, unlike commissioners,
magistrates were reimbursed for their expenses. 52 Together, these
factors eliminated the questionable practice of commissioners
working on a fee-for-service basis and helped attract better quali
fied personnel through an enhanced compensation system.
Congress intended the district courts to make extensive use of
these new judicial officers. 53 The language of the original Magis
trates Act granted a district court judge broad discretion to assign
tasks under the "additional duties" clause. 54 Magistrates were
given the authority to serve as special masters in civil actions, make
recommendations to the district court judge regarding post-trial
motions, and to assist the judge in pretrial proceedings. 55
2.

The 1976 Amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act

District court judges were not as innovative in the use of mag
(2) assistance to a district court judge in the conduct of pretrial or discovery
proceedings in civil or criminal actions; and
(3) preliminary review of applications for post[-]trial relief made by individu
als convicted of criminal offenses, and submission of a report and recommen
dations to facilitate the decision of the district court judge ....
Id. (emphasis added).
50. § 631 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The House Judiciary Committee noted that
local district court judges were in the best position to assess individual qualifications of
a magistrate. H.R. REp. No. 1629, supra note 43, at 15, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
.
at 4258.
51.

§ 634.

52. § 635.
53. H.R. REp. No. 1609, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162, 6166.
For a discussion of how district courts have employed the services of magistrates,
see generally Carroll Seron, The Professional Project of Parajudges: The Case of u.s.
Magistrates,22 LAW & Soc. REv. 557 (1988); CARROLL SERON, THE ROLE OF MAGIS
TRATES IN FEDERAL DISTRIcr CoURTS, (Federal Judicial Center 1983).
54. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636
(1988). See supra note 49 for text of the original "additional duties" clause. In addition
to the language of the original Act which clearly stated that the duties are not restricted
to those explicitly listed in the legislation, the Judiciary Committee report also noted
that the categories listed were intended to be illustrative rather than exclusive of the
duties that could be assigned. H.R. REp. No. 1629, supra note 43, at 19, reprinted in
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4262.
55. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1113 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636
(1988».
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istrates as Congress had hoped. Instead, courts took a restrictive
view of how magistrates could be employed. 56 As a result, Con
gress amended the Act in 1976 to clarify and define what was in
tended by the "additional duties" clause. 57
Section 636(b) was completely rewritten. This section, known
as the "pretrial matters clause,"58 permitted a judge to "designate a
magistrate to determine any pretrial matter,"59 except for eight dis
positive motions. 60 The House Judiciary Committee Report on the
amendment emphasized that, with the exception of these disposi
tive motions, a magistrate had "the power to make a determination
of any pretrial matter."61 Significantly, Title III authority was not
one of the powers specifically withheld by the "pretrial matters"
clause. Moreover, although magistrates were prevented from mak
ing a final determination of the enumerated dispositive motions,
they were permitted to make recommendations on these motions
56. See Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974) (magistrate may not hold a habeas
corpus hearing); Ingram v. Richardson 471 F.2d 1268 (6th Cir. 1972) (magistrate may
not review Secretary's denial of social security benefits and make recommendation to a
district court judge).
57. S. REp. No. 625, H.R. REp. No. 1609, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162. See also Brendan Linehan Shannon, The Federal Magistrates
Act: A New Article III Analysis for a New Breed ofJudicial Officer, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 253, 258-59 (1991); Marla Eisland, Note, The Federal Magistrates Act: Are De
fendants' Rights Violated When Magistrates Preside Over Jury Selection in Felony
Cases?, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 783, 786-87 (1988).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1988) provides:
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary
(A) a judge may designate a magistrate to hear and determine any pretrial
matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, forjudg
ment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indict
ment or information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a
criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involunta
rily dismiss an action. A judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial matter
under this subparagraph (A) where it has been shown that the magistrate's
order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
(B) a judge may also designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, including
evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings
of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court, of
any motion excepted in subparagraph (A), of applications for post[-]trial relief
made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions
challenging conditions of confinement.
Id. (emphasis added).
59. Id.
60. Id. See also H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 9-10, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6170-71.
61. H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 10, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6170 (emphasis added).
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that could be adopted at the discretion of the district court judge.62
Further indication that Congress intended the Act to be
broadly interpreted may be found in the introductory language of
section 636(b)(1), which begins "[n]otwithstanding any provision of
law to the contrary."63 The House Judiciary Committee Report
stated the reason for the inclusion of this clause as follows:
The initial sentence of the revised section uses the phrase
"notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary-." This
language is intended to overcome any problem which may be
caused by the fact that scattered throughout the code are statutes
which refer to "the judge" or "the court." It is not feasible for
the Congress to change each of those terms to read "the judge or
a magistrate." It is therefore intended that the permissible as
signment of additional duties to a magistrate shall be governed
by the revised section 636(b), "notwithstanding any provision of
law" referring to "judge" or "court."64
Congress also amended the Magistrates Act by creating a new
"additional duties" clause, section 636(b)(3), that provides "[a]
magistrate may be assigned such additional duties as are not incon
sistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."65 The
original Federal Magistrates Act contained similar language. 66
When the Act was amended, Congress placed this language in a
separate subsection to emphasize that the additional duties were
not to be limited by other sections of the Act. 67 This subsection was
intended to encourage judges "to continue innovative experimenta
tions in the use of [magistrates]."68 Congress believed such experi
mentation would result in the assignment of a wide range of
additional functions to magistrates,69 thereby improving the effi
ciency of the federal courts by allowing judges to devote increased
time to their adjudicatory duties. 70
The Federal Magistrates Act, its legislative history, and subse
quent amendments show that Congress intended to grant magis
62.
63.
64.
6169.
65.
66.
67.
6172.
68.
69.

70.

§ 636(b)(1)(B).
§ 636(b)(1).

H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
§ 636(b )(3).
See supra note 49 for the text of the original "additional duties" clause.
H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 10, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at

Id.
Id.
Id.
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trates authority to determine a wide range of issues. This authority
is only limited by the "Constitution and laws of the United States"71
and the discretion of district court judges.72 This grant of discretion
was intended to encourage judges to explore innovative methods of
using the magistrate's position to improve judicial efficiency.73
C. Judicial Construction of the Federal Magistrates Act Following
the 1976 Amendments
While the specific issue of a magistrate's authority with respect
to Title III was not addressed prior to In re United States ,74 the
United States Supreme Court, in several cases, has considered the
limits of a magistrate's authority. These cases identify the issues
that must be resolved in analyzing a magistrate's Title III authority.

1. United States v. Raddatz 75
In United States v. Raddatz,16 the Supreme Court considered
whether a magistrate could conduct an evidentiary hearing on a
motion to suppress without de novo review by a district court judge.
The Court first considered the Federal Magistrates Act which pro
vided that a magistrate could not make a binding determination on
certain dispositive motions, including a motion "to suppress evi
dence in a criminal case. "77 However, the Court noted that the Act
allows a judge to "designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, in
cluding evidentiary hearings" and then make recommendations to
71. § 636(b}(3}.
72. H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 10, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6172.
73. Id. Despite legislative history and amendments encouraging innovation, con
cerns over constitutional limits on magistrates' authority have continued to discourage
innovation in some courts. The Federal Courts Study Committee recommended that
this problem could be alleviated through a study of the possible constitutional limita
tions on magistrates. Additionally, the Committee recommended that judges be pro
vided with a specific list of tasks which fall within the pretrial matters and additional
duties clauses. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, April 2, 1990, at
80.
74. 10 F.3d 931 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 64 (1994).
75. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
76. Id. In Raddatz, the defendant moved to suppress incriminating statements he
had made to law enforcement officers. The district court referred the. motion to a mag
istrate over the defendant's objections. After a review of the findings, the district court
judge adopted the magistrate's recommendation, again over the defendant's objection.
The defendant's conviction was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, which held that the district court judge was required to be present at
the suppression hearing. Id.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b}(1}(A} (1988).
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the judge.18 The Act also provides that within ten days, a party may
object to the magistrate's recommendation, at which time the judge
shall make a de novo determination of the findings to which the
objection was made.19
The Court examined the interaction of these sections of the
Act, as well as its legislative history, to determine whether Congress
intended to require a de novo hearing, an actual rehearing of the
testimony, or a de novo determination, allowing the judge to
merely review the magistrate's findings. The Court found Con
gress' intent to be "unmistakable." The Court stated:
Congress focused on the potential for Art. III constraints in per
mitting a magistrate to make decisions on dispositive motions.
The legislative history discloses that Congress purposefully used
the word determination rather than hearing, believing that Art.
III was satisfied if the ultimate adjudicatory determination was
reserved to the district court judge .... Congress intended to per
mit whatever reliance a district judge, ... chose to place on a
magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations. 8o

Since Congress intended to rely upon the district court's judgment
regarding the weight to be assigned to a magistrate's report, the
Court found that requiring a de novo hearing would frustrate the
purpose of the Act. 81
After resolving that the evidentiary hearing was properly con
ducted under the Act, the Court addressed the question of whether
the defendant's right to due process required the presence of an
Article III judge at the suppression hearing. This issue hinged on
"whether the nature of ... the interests implicated in a motion to
suppress evidence require that the district court judge must actually
hear the challenged testimony."82 Despite the fact that a motion to
suppress often determines the outcome of a case, the Court found
that the interests involved in a suppression hearing were less signifi
cant than those involved in a criminal trial.83 Additionally, even
when the task of conducting the evidentiary hearing is delegated to
a magistrate, the district court judge is in control of the process and
78. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 673 (quoting § 636(b)(I)(B)).
79. § 636(b)(I).
80. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 676 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 676 n.3.
82. [d. at 677.
83. Id. at 678-79. The Court noted that the evidentiary standards in such a hear
ing were different than those at trial and that even if a defendant was unsuccessful on
his motion to suppress, the evidence could still be challenged at trial. Id.
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makes the filial binding decision. The Court determined that the
defendant's due process rights were adequately protected because
the ultimate control vested in the district court judge and a suppres
sion hearing involved interests of a lesser magnitude than those in
volved in a tria1. 84
2.

Gomez v. United States 85

In Gomez v. United States ,86 the Supreme Court considered
whether the "additional duties" clause87 permitted a magistrate to
conduct voir dire in a felony trial without the defendant's consent. 88
As in Raddatz, the Court first looked to the language of the Act
and found neither specific authorization nor a specific prohibition
concerning voir dire. 89 The Court noted that the limiting factors
under the "additional duties" clause are the Constitution and the
laws of the United States90 and that the Court would interpret the
Act in a manner that avoided raising constitutional issues.9 1 The
Court reasoned that the duties specifically authorized by the Act
should serve as the framework for determining what additional du
ties would be permissible. 92
In reviewing the legislative history of the Magistrates Act, the
Court noted that Congress intended district court judges to make
extensive use of magistrates. 93 Additionally, a primary goal of the
84. Id. at 679-81.
85. 490 U.S. 858 (1989).
86. Id. In Gomez, the defendant objected when the district court judge assigned
a magistrate to conduct voir dire. The judge denied the objection but offered de novo
review of any challenges. No challenges were made. The United States Court of Ap
peals for the Second Circuit affirmed the petitioner's conviction, finding the delegation
of voir dire within the "additional duties" clause of the Federal Magistrates Act. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding voir dire was part of the trial, which meant the de
fendant had a right to have an Article III judge conduct voir dire.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1988) provides that "[a] magistrate may be assigned
such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws of the
.
United States." Id.
88. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 860.
89. Id. at 863.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 864. "It is our settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a federal
statute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative interpretation
poses no constitutional question." [d.
92. Id. "When a statute creates an office to which it assigns specific duties, those
duties outline the attributes of the office. Any additional duties performed pursuant to
a general authorization in the statute reasonably should bear some relation to the speci
fied duties." Id.
.
93. Id. at 869 (citing H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 5, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6172).
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Act was to permit district court judges to devote increased time to
their adjudicatory functions by delegating non-adjudicatory tasks to
magistrates. 94 Consistent with this purpose, essentially adjudicatory
tasks would be more properly performed by a district court judge.95
In 1979, Congress amended the Magistrates Act to expand a
magistrate's authority in criminal proceedings with the express limi
tation that the parties must consent to the magistrate's participa
tion. 96 The Court reviewed the provisions of the Magistrates Act
and, in view of its subsequent amendments, concluded that the Act
carefully defined a magistrate's authority in criminal proceedings .
. TQe Court then reasoned that the limited grant of authority to pre
side at trials involving civil matters and misdemeanors was indica
tive of Congress intent to withhold authority to preside at felony
trials. 97 Therefore, the authority to conduct voir dire could not be
implied from the general language of the Magistrates Act. 98
The lack of specific statutory authorization to conduct voir dire
compelled the Court to consider the constitutional concerns impli
cated in delegating the task to a magistrate. The defendant had a
constitutional right to the presence of a district court judge at all
stages of the trial. Finding that voir dire more closely resembles a
trial rather than a pretrial proceeding, the Court concluded that the
defendant had a constitutional right to require the presence of a
district court judge.99 As a result, the Gomez Court held that a
magistrate CQuid not be assigned to conduct voir dire without the
defendant's consent. lOO

Id. at ff72 & n.23.
95. Id. at ff73.
96. 18 U.S.c. § 3401(a) (1988) provides that a district judge may designate a mag
istrate to try persons charged with misdemeanors. Even when a judge makes such a
designation, a magistrate can only exercise this jurisdiction with the written consent of
the defendant. § 3401(a)(b).
97. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 872.
98. Id. The Court expressed its concern that voir dire was the type of procedure
which did not lend itself easily to de novo review because firsthand observation of the
jurors' demeanor is critical in determining their suitability. This type of observation is
best accomplished when jurors are first questioned and introduced to the case. Since
direct observation is of such great value in evaluating potential jurors, the defendant'S
right to the presence of an Article III judge is not adequately protected by a judge's
reexamination of jurors. Id. at 874-75.
99. Id. at ff72-73 (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 374 (1892)).
100. Id. at 876.
94.
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Peretz v. United States 101

1\vo years later, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue
of whether a magistrate could conduct voir dire. The critical dis
tinction between Gomez and Peretz was that, in Peretz, the magis
trate impaneled the jury with the defendant's consent and no
objection was raised until after conviction. 102 Writing for the ma
jority, Justice Stevens noted that the Gomez decision was limited to
situations in which the parties did not consent to the magistrate's
participation in voir dire .103 Because the defendant in Gomez had
not consented, the assignment of the magistrate to conduct voir
dire raised the issue of whether the defendant had a constitutional
right to demand the presence of an Article III judge at each stage of
the trial. 104 Because of the constitutional question raised by the de
fendant's objection, the Gomez Court had required a clear expres
sion of congressional intent regarding a magistrate's authority to
conduct voir dire .105
Since the defendant in Peretz consented to a magistrate being
assigned to conduct voir dire, the Court attached "far less impor
tance ... to the fact that Congress did not focus on jury selection as
a possible additional dUty."l06 Instead, the Court placed substantial
weight upon Congress' intention to improve the efficiency of the
judicial system and held that delegation of voir dire, with the con
sent of the parties in a criminal trial, was consistent with congres
sional intent.1 07
The Court, in Raddatz, Gomez, and Peretz, applied traditional
rules of statutory construction to determine whether a particular
task may be assigned under the Federal Magistrates Act. The initial
step was to look for specific authorization within the Magistrates
Act. Since both the "pretrial matters" and "additional duties"
clauses provide general grants of authority, language authorizing a
specific task often does not exist. Where the language of the Act
contained no specific authorization or exclusion, the Court deter
101. 501 U.S. 923 (1991).
102. Id. at 925-26.
103. Id. at 927-28.
104. Id. at 929-30.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 932.
107. Id. The opinion makes frequent reference to the importance of magistrates.
"[W]e recognize that Congress intended magistrates to play an integral and important
role in the federal judicial system." Id. at 928. "[T]he role of the magistrate in today's
federal judicial system is nothing less than indispensable." Id. (quoting Government of
the Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 1989».
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mined whether the task was consistent with Congress' intent in en
acting the Magistrates Act.
As the Gomez Court noted, the duties specified in the Magis
trates Act provided the framework for determining what Congress
intended as permissible duties.108 The Court reasoned that if no
constitutional issues were implicated, a task consistent with con
gressional intent was within the scope of the Act. Finally, the Court
has applied a more stringent analysis in cases which raised constitu
tional issues. 109 In such cases, where neither the Act nor congres
sional intent was obvious, the Court has interpreted the Act
narrowly, choosing the alternative which avoids the implication of
constitutional questions.
II.

IN RE UNITED STATESllO

A. District Court Proceedings
In February, 1992, Judge Korman, serving in the Miscellaneous
Part of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York, announced his intention to refer all applications for
electronic eavesdropping orders to a United States Magistrate
Judge for approval. lll Judge Korman found this delegation of au
thority to be authorized under both the "pretrial matters"112 and
"additional duties"1l3 clauses of the Federal Magistrates Act.1 l4
Judge Korman also found wiretap applications analogous to appli
cations for search warrants and arrest warrants, which magistrates
mayapprove. U5 According to Judge Korman, Congress' stated ob
jective of allowing a district court judge to devote more time to ad
judicatory duties would be furthered by delegating wiretap
authority to magistrates.u 6
108. Gomez v. United States,490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989).
Id. See supra note 91.
110. 10 F.3d 931 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 64 (1994).
111. In re United States Attorney, 784 F. Supp. 1019,1020 (E.D.N.Y. 1992),
rev'd, 10 F.3d 931 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 64 (1994).
112. 28 U.S.c. § 636(b)(I) (1988).
113. § 636(b)(3). "A magistrate may be assigned such additional duties as are not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." Id.
114. In re United States Attorney, 784 F. Supp. at 1021.
115. Id. at 1025.
116. Id. at 1027. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1988) imposes follow-up duties on the judge
issuing a wiretap order. The judge may require periodic reports while the wiretap is in
effect. All recordings must be delivered to the judge who is responsible for sealing and
maintaining custody of the recordings. [d. Additionally, the judge must file a detailed
report with the Administrative Office of the United States Courts within thirty days of
the expiration of an order. § 2519.
109.
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On June 30, 1993, Judge Korman made his first referral. The
United States Attorney then petitioned for a mandamus review of
the district court's order due to the government's concern that evi
dence obtained under an electronic surveillance order issued by a
magistrate would be ruled inadmissible. The government argued
that authorization of a wiretap by a magistrate would violate the
authorization provisions of Title 111.117
B.

The Majority Opinion

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
granted mandamus review and held that there must be explicit stat
utory language authorizing magistrates to approve applications for
electronic eavesdropping. 118
The majority's analysis focused on the language of TItle III, the
Federal Magistrates Act, and the Electronic Communications and
Privacy Act of 1986 (the "Privacy Act")119 as well as Congress' in
tent in passing those acts. Since the Magistrates Act postdated TItle
III, considerable attention was given to whether the language of
Title III could be read fairly to include federal magistrates within its
authorization provisions. Additionally, the court considered
whether the language of the Magistrates Act could be construed to
permit approval of wiretap applications. 12o
The Second Circuit, in its Title III analysis, employed a strict
reading of the language used by Congress. The court found that
congressional concern over the intrusive nature of wiretaps and the
extensive detail governing the wiretap application process indicated
that Congress intended the use of wiretaps to be strictly con
trolled. 121 As a result of Congress' privacy concerns, the court rea
soned that magistrates must have explicit congressional
authorization to approve these applications.1 22
The majority's inquiry regarding congressional intent hinged
on whether the authorization provisions of Title 111123 could be read
117.
(1994).

In re United States, 10 F.3d 931 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 64

Id. at 938.
18 U.S.c. §§ 3121-3127 (1988).
120. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 934-35.
121. Id. at 938.
122. Id.
123. 18 U.S.c. § 2516(1) (Supp. V 1993) requires that an electronic surveillance
application must be approved by "a federal judge of competent jurisdiction." Id. See
supra note 26 for full text of § 2516(1).
.
18 U.S.c. § 2510(9) (1988) defines a "judge of competent jurisdiction" as:
118.

119.
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to include magistrates. The court noted that the phrase "federal
judge of competent jurisdiction" was defined as "a judge of the
United States district court or a United States court of appeals."124
However, the court was unwilling to read this language expansively
to include magistrates. 125
The Second Circuit found strong support for this proposition in
United States v. Giordano .126 In Giordano, the Supreme Court had
held that the Attorney General could not delegate the authority to
authorize a wiretap application to the Attorney General's Execu
tive Assistant. 127 The Supreme Court found that such a delegation
was limited by TItle III, even though the Attorney General had
general statutory authorization128 to delegate duties within the Jus
tice Department. 129 Although the language of Title III did not ex
(a) a judge of a United States district court or a United States court of appeals;
and
(b) a judge of any court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State who is au
thorized by a statute of that State to enter orders authorizing interceptions or
wire, oral, or electronic communications.
Id.
124. § 251O(9)(a).
125. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 938.
126. 416 U.S. 505 (1974). In Giordano, the Court considered whether to admit
evidence obtained under a wiretap application authorized by the Attorney General's
Executive Assistant. The application, which was approved by a district court judge, was
submitted by an Assistant United States Attorney. The application inaccurately de
. scribed the Assistant Attorney General as the authorizing official when it had actually
been authorized by the Attorney General's Executive Assistant.
The authorization provisions of TItle III have been amended since Giordano was
decided in 1970. The authorization provision in effect in 1970 provided that applica
tions must be authorized by "the Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General
specially designated by the Attorney General." Pub. L. No. 90-351,82 Stat. 216 (codi
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1968)). This provision was subsequently
amended to enlarge the number of officials within the Department of Justice that were
authorized to approve wiretap applications. The authorization provision now in effect
provides:
The Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney Gen
eral, or any Assistant Attorney General, any acting Assistant Attorney Gen
eral or any Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division
specially designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to
a Federal judge of competent jurisdiction for, and such judge may grant in
conformity with section 2518 of this chapter an order authorizing or approving
the interception of wire or oral communications ....
§ 2516(1) (Supp. V 1993).
127. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 514.
128. 28 U.S.c. § 510 (1988) provides: "The Attorney General may from time to
time make such provisions as he considers appropriate authorizing the performance by
any other officer, employee, or agency of the Department of Justice of any function of
the Attorney General." Id. (emphasis added).
129. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 514.
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pressly prohibit the Attorney General from delegating authority,
the Supreme Court held that Congress' intent was to allow wiretap
applications to be initiated only by those persons who were "re
sponsive to the political process."130
The Second Circuit found a strong parallel between the Attor
ney General's responsibility to authorize wiretap applications and a
district court's responsibility to review them. The authorization
provisions131 and definitions 132 contained in Title III contain no ref
erence to magistrates. The majority reasoned that, since Giordano
limited Title III authority to authorize wiretap applications to only
those specifically named, approval of the use of wiretaps should be
similarly limited. Since magistrates are not specifically mentioned
in Title Ill's provisions, the court reasoned they could not exercise
Title III authority.B3
It is important to note that as Title III predated the Federal
Magistrates Act, it was impossible for Congress to have included
magistrates in Title Ill's provisions. The court considered this argu
ment and found it unpersuasive since Congress could have written
specific authorization into the Magistrates Act or amended Title III
to grant approval power. l34 The court noted that Congress also
could have addressed the issue in the Privacy Act 135 but failed to do
so.
The Second Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that
a magistrate could assume the authority to approve wiretaps under
130. Id. at 520.
131. 18 U.S.c. § 2516(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See supra note 26 for the rele
vant statutory text.
132. §§ 2510(9)(a), 2516. See supra note 123 for the full statutory text of
§ 2510(9).
133. In re United States, 10 F.3d 931, 938 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 64
(1994).
134. Id.
135. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (1988), the Privacy Act, makes no mention of magis
trates with regard to wiretaps. The Act does provide that an application for the use of a
pen register or trap and trace device may be made to a court of competent jurisdiction.
§ 3122(a)(I). A pen register records the numbers dialed from a telephone, while a trap
and trace device records the numbers of incoming calls. § 3127(3).
The Privacy Act defines a court of competent jurisdiction as "a district court of the
United States (including a magistrate of such court) or a United States Court of Ap
peals." § 3127(2)(A) (emphasis added).
The Second Circuit found that had Congress intended magistrates to fall within the
definition of a "Federal judge of competent jurisdiction," it easily could have amended
Title III at the time the Privacy Act was passed. The Act did make several changes in
the definitions contained in Title III but left § 2510(9) unchanged. In re United States,
10 F.3d at 936.
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the Act's "pretrial matters"136 and "additional duties"137 clauses.
The enumerated powers granted to a magistrate contain no refer
ence to Title III but rather give magistrates, inter alia, the right to
assist the district court in pretrial matters. 138 Although the "pretrial
matters" clause includes the power to issue search warrants or
arrest warrants, the court found these warrants were not analogous
to wiretap applications. The court reasoned· that electronic surveil
lance is much more intrusive than a physical search and therefore
held that the authority to issue a search warrant did not imply the
authority to approve a wiretap.139 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit recognized that amendments to the Magistrates Act
were intended to prevent the Act from being construed narrowly.140
However, the court held that, given Congress' overriding concern
for protecting· individual privacy, expansion of a magistrate's au
thority to include the area of electronic surveillance could not be
justified.141
C.

Judge Cardamone's Dissent

In his dissent, Judge Cardamone focused on the language of
the Magistrates Act rather than on Title III. He reviewed the legis
lative history of the Magistrates Act and found that Congress in
tended a magistrate's powers to be interpreted as broadly as
possible. Judge Cardamone noted that Congress had amended the
Act in 1976 because courts had construed the Act too narrowly,
inhibiting the judicial experimentation Congress sought to en
courage when the Act was passed. 142
The 1976 amendment that rewrote the "pretrial matters"
clause specifically provided eight exceptions143 to matters that fall
136. 28 u.s.c. § 636(b)(I) (1988).
137. § 636(b)(3). See supra note 113 for the full statutory text.
138. § 636(b)(I).
139. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 938. The court noted that Congress had specif
ically withheld wiretap authority from United States commissioners who were replaced
by the passage of the Federal Magistrates Act. Id. Congress felt that commissioners
could not be entrusted with the responsibility to approve wiretaps, given the permis
siveness with which they issued search warrants. S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 91,
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2179. See supra note 36 for the pertinent language.
See also H.R. REp. No. 1629, supra note 43, at 13, repriTited in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
4256.
140. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 938.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 939 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I)(A) (1988) provides:
A judge may designate a magistrate to hear and determine any pretrial matter
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within a magistrate's authority. Judge Cardamone reasoned that
these eight exclusions, coupled with the fact that Title III referrals
are not mentioned, indicated that Congress did not intend to deny
magistrates the authority to approve wiretap applications. Instead,
the dissent found wiretap applications to be similar to search and
arrest warrants which may be approved by magistrates under the
authority granted by the "pretrial matters" clause. Judge
Cardamone determined that search warrants, arrest warrants, and
wiretap applications require magIstrates to make similar probable
cause determinations. 144 Based on the similar probable cause de
termination required by all three types of warrants, Judge
Cardamone reasoned that the authority to approve wiretaps was
consistent with the matters that may be delegated under the "pre
trial duties" clause. 145
Judge Cardamone noted that when Congress passed the Magis
trates Act, the Senate and House Judiciary Committees recognized
that it would be impractical for Congress to change every reference
to a judge or court to include magistrates. l46 For this very reason,
Congress inserted the language "notwithstanding any provision of
law to the contrary" into the ACt. 147 Since the specific purpose of
this language was to eliminate the need for adding the term "magis
trate" throughout the Code, the absence of the word magistrate in
Title III was not, by itself, indicative of a congressional intent to
withhold wiretap authority from magistrates.
Judge Cardamone also reasoned that the "additional duties"
clause was also a possible source of Title III authority. Congress
provided this clause to allow district court judges the freedom to
... except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for
summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by
the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit
maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action.
Id. (emphasis added).
144. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 941 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). Although
Judge Cardamone cites no case law supporting this analogy, it is consistent with the
Supreme Court's holding in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz the
Court held that a warrant was required since the invasion of privacy resulting from a
wiretap implicated the same rights as those involved in a physical search. Id. at 353.
See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
145. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 941 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
146. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
147. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 940. See also supra note 64 and accompanying
text.
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make innovative use of magistrates. l48 Indeed, such experimenta
tion has generally been permitted so long as constitutional issues
are not involved. 149 Judge Cardamone found no constitutional con
cern was implicated here, since the probable cause determination
required by the Fourth Amendment150 is essentially the same in
both wiretap applications and affidavits supporting search
warrants. 151
III.

ANALYSIS

In In re United States, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that a magistrate could not be delegated
the task of authorizing an application for electronic surveillance be
cause such a delegation of authority was inconsistent with the goals
Congress sought to achieve in enacting Title IIJ.152 Additionally;
the Second Circuit held that the language of the Federal Magis
trates Act did not permit delegation of wiretap approval to a
magistrate. 153
However, a different result may be reached when the language
of the Act is analyzed within the parameters developed by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Raddatz,154 Gomez v. United
States, 155 and Peretz v. United States .156 In those cases the Court
focused on the specific language of the Act, Congress' intent in en
148. H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6172.
149. See supra part I.C, discussing Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991)
(holding that a magistrate may conduct voir dire with defendant's consent) and Gomez
v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989) (holding that a magistrate cannot conduct voir
dire without defendant's consent).
150. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
151. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 943.
152. Id. at 938.
153. Id.
154. 447 U.S. 667 (1980). See supra part I.C.1 for a discussion of the Court's
opinion in Raddatz.
155. 490 U.S. 858 (1989). See supra part I.C.2 for a discussion of the Court's
opinion in Gomez.
156. 501 U.S. 923 (1991). See supra part I.C.3 for a discussion of the Court's
opinion in Peretz.

294

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:271 .

acting the Magistrates Act, and the significance of the constitutional
issues raised by the delegation of a particular task to a magistrate.
A.

The Statutory Language

The Second Circuit's first step in analyzing the government's
appeal of the district court's order was to examine the relevant stat
utory language. 157 The Court found it significant that neither Title
III, the Magistrates Act, nor the Privacy Act 158 contain language
specifically authorizing a magistrate to approve Title III
applications. 159
Although the language of the Magistrates Act does not include
the authority to approve wiretap applications as one of a magis
trate's enumerated powers, the list of enumerated powers is not ex
Clusive.1 60 Additionally, the approval of Title III applications is not
one of the items specifically excluded from a magistrate's power to
"hear and determine."161 The "pretrial matters" clause gives a
judge the power to delegate "any pretrial matter" to a magistrate162
and Congress considered search and arrest warrants to be pretrial
matters within the definition of the Magistrates Act. 163 If wiretap
warrants are a specific type of search warrant, it may be argued that
they fall within the ~tegory of pretrial matters.
Additionally, in Gomez v. United States,164 the Supreme Court
held that a magistrate's additional duties must be based on their
relationship to their specific duties. 165 Magistrates have the author
ity to issue search warrants and to approve the use of "pen regis
ters" and "trap and trace devices. "166 In both instances, magistrates
are making probable cause determinations involving privacy rights
and in the latter case a form of electronic surveillance is being em
ployed. Under the Gomez test, the additional duty-approving
157. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 934.
158. 18 U.S.c. §§ 3121-3127 (1988).
159. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 935-38.
160. See H.R. REp. No. 1629, supra note 43, at 19, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
al4262.
161. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I)(A) (1988).
162. Id.
163. See H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 6-7, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6166-67.
164. 490 U.S. 858 (1989).
165. Id. at 864.
166. See infra part III.B discussing the similarities among wiretap warrants,
search warrants, pen registers and trap and trace devices.
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wiretap applications-bears a strong relation to the specific duties
already granted to magistrates.
The Second Circuit also found it significant that TItle III itself
makes no specific mention of a magistrate's authority. Of course,
the definition in Title III could not have included magistrates since
that judicial officer did not exist at the time Title III was enacted.
A Title III application must be authorized by "a Federal judge of
competent jurisdiction,"167 which is defined as either a federal dis
trict or appellate court judge,168 Because magistrates are not in
cluded within Title Ill's definition of a court of competent
jurisdiction, the Second Circuit reasoned that Title III authority
could not be delegated to a magistrate. 169 The Court relied on
United States v. Giordano, 170 for the proposition that the language
of TItle III is to be strictly construed.1 71
Because a magistrate had never been delegated wiretap au
thority, the courts have not had occasion to decide how narrowly
the definition of a judge of competent jurisdiction should be con
strued. Although the language of Title III makes no reference to
magistrates, Title III cannot be read in isolation. The language of
section 636(b )172 of the Magistrates Act was intended as a modifica
tion of language throughout the United States Code,173 If, as sec
tion 636(b) requires, the term "judge" in TItle III is read to include
the term "magistrate," then Title III would implicitly grant magis
trates wiretap authority.
B.

Congressional Intent

Since the statutory language is not dispositive, the next step in
the analysis is to determine whether the legislative history of the
statutes indicates that Congress intended TItle III authority to fall
within the scope of a magistrate's duties. The Second Circuit's
holding that Congress had no such intent was based on its interpre
tation of the legislative history of Title III and Congress' subse
quent failure to either amend Title III or include TItle III authority
167. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (Supp. V 1993).
168. § 2510(9)(a). See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
169. In re United States, 10 F.3d 931, 935-36 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. O.
64 (1994).
.
170. 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
171. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 937.
172. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1988).
173. H.R. REP. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6169. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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in the Magistrates ACt. 174
The phrase "a Federal judge of competent jurisdiction" was a
focal point of the court's analysis. The Second Circuit relied heav
ily on the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee as an indication
of whether this phrase could be read to include magistrates. 175 In
enacting Title III, Congress made it clear that it intended to with
hold Title III authority from United States commissioners due to
dissatisfaction with the perfunctory manner in which they approved
search and arrest warrants. 176 The court reasoned that a judicial
officer's power to approve Title III applications could not be in
ferred from the fact that the judicial officer could issue search
warrants. 177
The Second Circuit's conclusion is not as inevitable as it ap
pears. Congress did not simply withhold Title III authority from
commissioners, it abolished the office and replaced it with magis
trates. The fact that magistrates were given duties that had been
improperly executed by their predecessors, coupled with the more
substantive duties granted to magistrates by Congress, provides
clear evidence that Congress did not liken one office to the other.
The commissioners' powers merely formed the basis for determin
ing the initial powers Congress granted to magistrates. 178 There
fore, while it is clear that Congress intended to withhold wiretap
authority from commissioners, it is not equally clear that the same
restraint was intended to be placed on magistrates. The Second
Circuit's conclusion that magistrates and commissioners should be
subject to the same restraints is undermined by the fact that Con
gress and the courts consistently have expressed high regard for the
performance of magistrates since the office was established. 179
174.
175.

In re United States, 10 F.3d at 938.
Id. The report is necessarily silent on the subject of magistrates because they

did not exist at the time. The definition pointedly excluded United States commission
ers however. Congress noted that commissioners were poorly suited to protect privacy
. interests in the area of electronic surveillance, given their permissive practices in grant
ing search warrants. See S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 91, reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2179. See supra note 36.
When the same Congress later passed the Federal Magistrates Act, it once again
noted that commissioners were too permissive in granting search warrants and arrest
warrants. H.R. REp. No. 1629, supra note 43, at 13, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4256.
176. H.R. REp. No. 1629, supra note 43, at 13, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4256.
177. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 938.
178. 28 U.S.c. § 636(a)(1) (1988) provides that a magistrate shall have "all pow
ers and duties conferred or imposed upon United States commissioners." Id.
179. See H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 4, 6 reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6164, 6166.
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The Second Circuit's reliance on United States v. Giordano 180
as a basis for finding Congress intended to deny magistrates Title
III authority is also questionable. The legislative history of Title III
cited in Giordano clearly indicates that Congress, as well as the De
partment of Justice, intended to limit which officials within the De
partment of Justice could initiate wiretap applications. 181 This
limitation was created to ensure that any abuse of the process could
be traced to a clearly identifiable and politically responsible individ
ual who initiated the wiretap application. l82 The limitation on who
could approve a wiretap was motivated by a different concern: that
wiretaps were approved by a responsible judicial officer. That con
cern may be satisfied by a magistrate acting under authority dele
gated by a district court judge.
Although Congress specified matters that a magistrate could
not hear and determine, it still granted a district court judge broad
discretion to allow a magistrate to hear and make recommendations
on those very matters.183 Moreover, Congress required judicial au
thorization of a wiretap in order to conform to the criteria enunci
ated by the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States .184 The Court
required that the "impartial judgment of a judicial officer ... be
interposed between the citizen and the police."185 If Congress' pur
pose was to provide an additional layer of judicial authority as pro
tection for individuals' rights, this purpose may be satisfied through
the use of a magistrate.
Additionally, both the language and the legislative history of
the 1976 amendments to the Magistrates Act make it clear that
Congress intended the terms "judge" and "magistrate" to be used
interchangeably throughout the United States Code. l86 Indeed, the
only limitations on the magistrate's authority are those imposed by
inconsistency between the Magistrates Act and the Constitution or
"It can hardly be denied that the system created by the Federal Magistrates Act
has exceeded the highest expectations of the legislators who conceived it." Peretz v.
United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928 n.5 (1991) (quoting Government of the Virgin Islands
v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 308 (1989».
180. 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
181. [d. at 514-23.
182. S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 97, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2185.
183. 28 U.S.c. § 636(b)(I) (1988).
184. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 66, reprinted in
1968, U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2153.
185. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,481-82
(1962».
186. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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the laws of the United States. 187
Although the court in In re United States conceded that Con
gress intended the Magistrates Act to be interpreted broadly, it
held that Title III is one area in which the Act is intended to be
interpreted narrowly.1 88 The court found it significant that Title III
had not been amended to include magistrates within the definition
of "courts of competent jurisdiction."189
The court also found it significant that Congress failed to grant
magistrates Title III authority at the time the Privacy Act granted
them the authority to approve the use of pen registers and trap and
trace devices. 190 Here the court misinterpreted the intent of this
section of the Privacy Act. Rather than being a specific extension
of magistrates' authority, the Privacy Act was passed as a limitation
on the freedom of law enforcement officials to monitor telephone
activity. Pen registers and trap an~ trace devices were consciously
omitted from the restrictions of Title 111191 and, prior to passage of
the Privacy Act, the use of these devices was not restricted. 192 Pas
sage of the Privacy Act made the use of pen registers and trap and
trace devices subject to the warrant requirement contained in Title
III. Thus, the Privacy Act provides protection of privacy rights by
requiring the use of these devices be permitted only after proper
judicial approval has been obtained. Since the Privacy Act specifi
cally grants magistrates this authority, it is obvious that Congress
believed magistrates were competent to protect privacy rights.
It is clear from the legislative history of the Federal Magis
trates Act and its subsequent amendments that Congress has dis
played high regard for these judicial officers. 193 Congress clearly
expressed its intent that district courts should use magistrates in an
expansive and innovative manner when it amended the Act in
187. 28 U.S.c. § 636(b)(3) (1988).
188. In re United States, 10 F.3d 931, 936 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 64
(1994).
189. Id. at 936.
190. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 935-37. The Privacy Act specifically authorizes
magistrates to authorize the use of these devices. See supra note 135 for the statutory
language granting magistrates the authority to approve applications for the use of pen
registers and trap and trace devices. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(2)(A).
191. S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 90, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2178. "The proposed legislation is not designed to prevent the tracing of phone calls.
The use of a 'pen register,' for example, would be permissible." Id.
192. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(h)(1988) provides "[i]t shall not be unlawful under this
chapter (i) to use a pen register or trap and trace device." Id.
193. See H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 4-8, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.CAN. at 6164-68.
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1976. 194 That is exactly what Judge Korman attempted to do in del
egating approval of a Title III application to a magistrate. Thus, a
decision upholding Judge Korman's action would have been more
consistent with Congress' intent in enacting the Magistrates Act.
C.

Delegation of Title III Authority to a Magistrate Does Not
Violate the Fourth Amendment

When the language of a statute does not provide a clear grant
of authority, the policy of the Supreme Court has been to seek an
alternative which avoids raising potential constitutional ques
tions. 195 Although the Second Circuit did not express concern over
the constitutionality of a wiretap authorized by a magistrate, its rea
soning was based, in part, on the fact that a wiretap does implicate
Fourth Amendment privacy rights.1 96 The Second Circuit reasoned
that congressional concern for privacy rights was one factor that led
to the enactment of Title III. As a result of this concern, the court
held that the language of the Magistrates Act must be strictly con
strued in determining whether the delegation of Title III authority
was permissible. 197
However, neither the language of Title 111,198 nor its legislative
history, indicate that Congress believed there was a constitutional
requirement that an Article III judge authorize a wiretap.199 The
original requirement that a wiretap could not be used unless a war
rant had been obtained arose from the Supreme Court's holding in
Katz v. United States that electronic surveillance was an invasion of
privacy that implicated Fourth Amendment rights. 2OO Title Ill's au
thorization provision is designed to satisfy the Katz criteria "that
the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer ... be inter
194. See H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 10, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6172.
195. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989). "It is our settled policy to
avoid an interpretation of a federal statute that engenders constitutional issues if a rea
sonable alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question." Id.
196. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 938.
197. Id.
198. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(9)(b) (1988) grants wiretap authority to "a judge of any
court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State." Id.
199. See S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 97, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2179. Congress granted wiretap authority to state and federal court judges to ensure
warrant approval would be handled responsibly, not because it believed authorization
by an Article III judge was required by the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 36.
200. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353-56 (1967).
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posed between the citizen and the police."201 The Katz Court re
quired only the judgment of a judicial officer, rather than an Article
III judge, to satisfy the warrant criteria. As such, there is little
doubt that a magistrate would satisfy the constitutional wiretap
warrant requirement enunciated in Katz.
. The mere existence of a constitutional question does not force
the conclusion that magistrates are precluded from approving sur
veillance applications. Search warrants, as well as warrants for pen
registers and trap and trace devices, which may be issued by a mag
istrate,zo2 raise similar constitutional questions. The Katz Court
based its warrant requirement on the similarity between electronic
surveillance and physical searches of an individual's person or prop
erty.203 Because the rights protected by these types of warrants are
similar, it is consistent that they should both be approved by the
same judicial officer. Similarly, because a magistrate is permitted to
authorize search warrants, pen registers and trap and trace devices,
it follows that a magistrate should be permitted to issue wiretap
warrants.
However, these warrants are distinct in two significant areas.
First, a search warrant provides notice to the suspect, while a wire
tap warrant does not. Additionally, the lack of notice is inherent in
the nature of a wiretap; in Katz, the Court acknowledged that no
tice is not possible in wiretap situations, since notice would make it
impossible to obtain the evidence that was the target of the tap.204
The Katz Court held that a wiretap approved by a proper judicial
officer could serve the "legitimate needs of law enforcement" while
protecting the individual's right to privacy.205 The Supreme Court
found the imposition of a layer of judicial authority between the
police and the suspect essential to the preservation of the Fourth
Amendment rights of an individual who was the target of a wire
tap.206 Notice cannot be given to the target of a wiretap regardless
of the judicial authority authorizing the tap. Similarly, no notice is
given when pen registers or trap and trace devices are employed,
yet both may be authorized by magistrates. 207
201. Id. at 357 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,481-82 (1962».
See supra notes 24 & 27 and accompanying text.
202. Id. See supra note 135 for the statutory language authorizing a magistrate
to approve the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices.
203. Id. at 353.
204. Id. at 355 n.16.
205. Id. at 354-56.
206. Id. at 357.
207. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(2)(A) (1988).
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Second, while a search warrant permits a one-time search, the
wiretap warrant provides for a more intrusive continual monitoring
of the suspect. The greater degree of intrusiveness was one of the
reasons the Second Circuit found that search warrants were not
analogous to Title III applications.208 However, this high level of
intrusiveness exists regardless of who approves a Title III applica
tion. Pen registers and trap and trace devices also involve continual
monitoring of telephone activity, yet Congress specifically granted
magistrates the authority to approve their use. 209
Because of the intrusiveness of wiretaps, commentators have
argued for a stricter probable cause standard for wiretaps approved
by any judicial officer. 2lO Such a standard is better addressed by
specifying the evidentiary requirements that constitute probable
cause than by merely addressing who approves the warrant. Title
III already requires greater detail in a wiretap application than is
required for a search warrant. 211 Any government agent engaged
in investigating criminal activity may seek a search warrant. 212
Wiretap applications, however, may only be authorized by the "At
torney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney
General, or any acting Assistant Attorney General, or Deputy As
sistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division specifically desig
nated by the Attorney General."213 Additionally, a wiretap may
only be sought for the investigation of specified crimes,214 while a
search warrant may be sought to obtain evidence of any criminal
activity.2Is The application for a wiretap permit must also state that
all other means of investigation have failed and provide a complete
statement describing any previous wiretap applications regarding
the subject of the surveillance. 216 In contrast, a search warrant
merely requires that there be probable cause.217
208. In re United States, 10 F.3d 931, 938 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
(1994).
209. Id.
210. Elan Gerstmann, Letting Katz Out of the Bag: Re-Evaluating Probable
Cause in the Context of Electronic Eavesdropping, 22 Loy. U. Du. L.J. 193 (1990) (ar
guing for the requirement that law enforcement officials show a higher degree of prob
able cause in obtaining wiretap approval).
211. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515-2518 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) with FED. R. <:RIM.
P.41.
212. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(h).
213. § 2516(1) (Supp. V 1993).
214. § 2516(1)(a)-(n) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
215. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b).
216. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(c), (e) (1988).
217. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c).
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By providing strict requirements under Title III, Congress has
established a more stringent probable cause standard for wiretaps.
However, whether more stringent standards are required is not the
issue in this case. The intrusion into the privacy of a suspect is the
critical issue involved in the issuance of search or wiretap warrants.
As noted by the Katz Court, it is the need to protect personal pri
vacy that necessitates a warrant in either case. 218 A search warrant
issued by a magistrate satisfies the strictures of the Fourth Amend
ment for searches that intrude on personal privacy. Similarly, a
wiretap application approved by the same judicial officer should
satisfy the Katz criteria that a judicial officer be interposed between
the police and a suspect who is the subject of a wiretap.219
CONCLUSION

In In re United States ,220 the Second Circuit employed a restric
tive interpretation of both the Federal Magistrates Act and Title III.
This interpretation is inconsistent with the congressional intent un
derlying the passage and subsequent amendments to the Federal
Magistrates Act. The Magistrates Act was passed to improve the
efficiency of the judicial system by granting district court judges
broad discretion to delegate a wide range of tasks to magistrates.
Congress reacted to the failure of courts to experiment with innova
tive uses of magistrates by amending the Act in 1976 to create the
"pretrial matter" and "additional duties" clauses.
The district court judge's decision to delegate Title III author
ity to a magistrate was consistent with the type of experimentation
Congress sought to encourage in an effort to improve judicial effi
ciency. As Judge Korman noted, Title III imposes ongoing duties
on the judicial officer who approves a Title III application. There
fore, delegation of Title III authority would shift those duties to a
magistrate, freeing the district court judge to devote additional time
to adjudicatory duties that cannot be delegated.
The delegation of Title III authority is also consistent with the
criteria developed by the Supreme Court in analyzing additional
duties that may be delegated to a magistrate. This is particularly
true in light of the Court's decision to use a magistrate's enumer
ated powers as the basis for determining whether delegation of an
other duty is consistent with congressional intent. The probable
218. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353-55 (1967).
219. Id. at 357.
220. 10 F.3d 931 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 64 (1994).
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cause determination required by the approval of a Title III applica
tion is sufficiently analogous to the probable cause determinations
already made by magistrates in approving search and arrest war
rants. Additionally, magistrates are specifically authorized to ap
prove the use of other forms of electronic surveillance, namely pen
registers and trap and trace devices. The fact that Congress granted
this authority demonstrates congressional confidence in magis
trates' ability to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights in authorizing
the use of this type of electronic surveillance.
Delegation of Title III authority is also consistent with Title
Ill's goal of satisfying the Katz requirement that a responsible judi
cial officer be interposed between law enforcement officials and in
dividuals who are the subject of electronic surveillance.221
Congress demonstrated its confidence in magistrates' competence
by enlarging their duties through the 1976 amendments to the Mag
istrates Act and by specifically including magistrates within the Pri
vacy Act's definition of a court of competent jurisdiction.
Although a strong argument can be made that Title III author
ity may be delegated to a magistrate under the existing language of
Title III and the Magistrates Act, the Second Circuit's decision
makes it unlikely that such a delegation will be made in the future.
Law enforcement officials cannot proceed under a Title III applica
tion authorized by a magistrate without the fear that the evidence
obtained would later be ruled inadmissible. Therefore, Congress
should address this issue by amending Title III to expressly grant
district court judges the option of delegating Title III authority to a
magistrate. Such an amendment would preserve the involvement of
district court judges in Title III applications while providing a judge
with the option to delegate TItle III authority to a competent magis
trate. An amendment of this type would preserve the privacy safe
guards created by TItle III while enhancing the judicial efficiency
that is the fundamental goal of the Federal Magistrates Act.
Thomas R. Garcia

221. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.

